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Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols with threshold detectors are driving high-performance
QKD demonstrations. The corresponding security proofs usually assume that all physical detectors
have the same detection efficiency. However, the efficiencies of the detectors used in practice might
show a mismatch depending on the manufacturing and setup of these detectors. A mismatch can also
be induced as the different spatial-temporal modes of an incoming single might couple differently
to a detector. Here we develop a method that allows to provide security proofs without the usual
assumption. Our method can take the detection-efficiency mismatch into account without having
to restrict the attack strategy of the adversary. Especially, we do not rely on any photon-number
cut-off of incoming signals such that our security proof is complete. Though we consider polarization
encoding in the demonstration of our method, the method applies to a variety of coding mechanisms,
including time-bin encoding, and also allows for general manipulations of the spatial-temporal modes
by the adversary. We thus can close the long-standing question how to provide a valid, complete
security proof of a QKD setup with characterized efficiency mismatch. Our method also shows that
in the absence of efficiency mismatch, the key rate increases if the loss due to detection inefficiency
is assumed to be outside of the adversary’s control, as compared to the view where for a security
proof this loss is attributed to the action of the adversary.
I. INTRODUCTION
For practical quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] us-
ing photon-counting techniques (discrete variable QKD),
information is usually encoded in optical signals that con-
tain multiple photons. To decode the information, one
measures the optical signals usually with threshold detec-
tors which cannot tell apart the number of incoming pho-
tons. Security proofs of practical QKD protocols usually
assume that all threshold detectors used have the same
efficiency. Under this assumption, one can push the de-
tection efficiency into the transmission channel, which is
under Eve’s control. Thus the transmission loss and the
inefficiencies of the detectors can be lumped together,
and one can apply a security proof that applies to the
new increased effective transmission loss followed by ideal
threshold detectors with perfect efficiency [2].
In practice, however, it is not an easy job to build two
detectors that have exactly the same efficiency. For ex-
ample, the two detectors may be fabricated by different
processes and so a mismatch between their efficiencies is
induced. In the presence of efficiency mismatch, the dif-
ferent values for detection inefficiency cannot be lumped
together and further treated as a single value for the
loss over the transmission channel. Therefore, existing
security-proof techniques cannot be applied.
Even with a single detector, an efficiency mismatch
can be induced by an adversary. Suppose that the re-
sponse of this detector to a photon depends on its de-
grees of freedom such as spatial mode, frequency, or ar-
rival time. These degrees of freedom are not necessarily
being used to encode information. If an adversary can
manipulate these degrees of freedom, then an effective
efficiency mismatch is induced. When the induced mis-
match is large enough, powerful attacks on QKD systems
exist, as demonstrated in Refs. [3–6]. In typical experi-
ments the efficiency mismatch may not seem significant,
but it still means that the security cannot be formally
proven by existing techniques.
In this paper we develop analytic tools that allow,
subsequently, to prove with numerical methods the se-
curity in the presence of detection-efficiency mismatch.
The method works as long as the efficiency mismatch
is characterized, even if the mismatch depends addition-
ally on degrees of freedom of an optical signal that are
not exploited to encode information. To demonstrate
our approach, we apply it to a Prepare&Measure BB84-
QKD protocol [7]. Without loss of generality, we consider
polarization encoding. Here we study the general case
where the optical signals received by Bob may contain an
unbounded number of photons such that their states live
in an infinite-dimensional space. We can lower-bound
the secret-key rate as a function of detection-efficiency
mismatch and observed statistics. With our method, we
can also study the individual effects of transmission loss
and detection inefficiency on the secret-key rate. Our
method is transferable to other QKD protocols. We note
that Refs. [8–10] studied the security proof of the BB84-
QKD protocol in the presence of efficiency mismatch but
under the assumption that Bob receives no more than one
photon. However, this assumption cannot be justified in
practical implementations of QKD where threshold de-
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In
Sect. II we describe the basic setup for an optical BB84-
QKD implementation with a special emphasis on the de-
scription of the spatial-temporal modes coupled to the
detectors. Then we explain our method in Sect. III,
where we also apply it to the described setup. In order to
show the implication of our proof methods, we require a
toy-model that describes what observations we would ex-
pect in real experiments, which we do in Sect. IV. There
we also show the secret-key rates that we obtain for se-
tups that exhibit detection-efficiency mismatch. We sum-
marize our findings in Sect. V. We note that all detectors
considered in the rest of the paper are threshold detectors
by default.
II. EXPERIMENTAL CONFIGURATION
The method that we develop in this article is about the
treatment and analysis of the detector. Therefore, to lay
out and illustrate the method we develop, it is sufficient
to use the simple BB84 protocol [7], which we consider
with an ideal single-photon source, but with threshold
detectors monitoring full optical modes. Without loss of
generality, we use the polarization-encoding language.
For our theoretical analysis, we use the entanglement-
based formulation of Bennett, Brassard and Mermin [11].
This approach has been later generalized for general
QKD protocols to the source-replacement scheme [12].
This source-replacement scheme, in a thought-setup, re-
alizes the source by preparing internally to the source a
bi-partite entangled state. Measurements on one system
effectively prepare the remaining system in the desired
signal states with the prescribed probabilities. In the
case of the BB84 protocol with an ideal single-photon
source, the internal entangled state in the thought-set-
up is the maximally entangled state
|Φ〉AA′ =
1√
2
(|H〉A |H〉A′ + |V 〉A |V 〉A′), (1)
where |H〉 and |V 〉 are horizontally and vertically polar-
ized single-photon states, respectively. System A′ is pre-
pared in the signal states of the BB84 protocol as Alice
uniformly randomly selects to measure the system A in
the horizontal/vertical (H/V ) basis or the diagonal/anti-
diagonal (D/A) basis. System A′ enters the channel con-
trolled by Eve and will emerge as system B at Bob’s site.
At that stage, the signal is not necessarily a single-photon
signal, but can (due to Eve’s action) be in any state of the
optical modes supported by the detectors. For example,
Eve might amplify the signal using an optical amplifier
or replace the signals with multi-photon states at her
discretion. Bob thus has to perform a measurement on
the full optical modes, not on the single-photon signals.
In our setup, he randomly selects to measure the signal
in either the H/V basis or the D/A basis of the optical
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FIG. 1. Schematic of Bob’s measurement device: panel (a)
and (b) describe the active-detection and passive-detection
schemes respectively. To actively or passively select a mea-
surement basis, a polarization rotator or a 50/50 beam split-
ter is used. Under each basis, a polarizing beam splitter and
two detectors are used to measure the polarization state of
an incoming optical signal. Each detector is labelled by the
associated measurement outcome.
modes supported by his device. We call the above pro-
cedure of preparing, distributing and measuring signal
states a round.
After a large number of rounds, with the data record-
ings that detail Alice’s effective signal choices and Bob’s
measurement outcomes, Alice and Bob continue the
QKD protocol using the usual steps of testing, sifting,
key map, error correction, and privacy amplification to
obtain secret keys. Our method can be easily generalized
for other protocols that use, for example, weak coherent
pulses as signal states, but the single-photon source ex-
ample studied in this work is sufficient to demonstrate
our method, which is about the detection side.
So let us turn our attention to Bob’s detection: Ei-
ther the active- or passive-detection scheme, as depicted
in Fig. 1, can be exploited. As the detectors used in
each scheme are threshold detectors, each detector can
respond to an incoming optical signal only in two differ-
ent ways, click or no click. The detectors might respond
to different modes (frequency, timing, etc).
As stated in the introduction, there are two scenarios
where an detection-efficiency mismatch may exist. Let us
start with the first one. Due to the fabrications or setups
in practice, the two detectors shown in Fig. 1(a) for the
active-detection scheme may have different efficiencies
ηH/D and ηV/A. Similarly, the four detectors in Fig. 1(b)
for the passive-detection scheme may have efficiencies ηH ,
ηV , ηD and ηA respectively. Here, the subscripts indicate
the detectors used in a scheme. We call this kind of
mismatch the spatial-temporal-mode-independent mis-
match, in contrast to the following mismatch which de-
pends additionally on the spatial-temporal modes chosen
by an adversary.
The second scenario is that of an active adversary. By
manipulating the spatial-temporal mode of an optical sig-
nal, the adversary can change the coupling of the signal
with a detector, resulting in a change in the effective
detection efficiency of the detector. Especially in free-
space QKD it is possible for Eve to change the angle of
3TABLE I. Spatial-temporal-mode-dependent mismatch
model in the active-detection scheme, where 0 ≤ η2 ≤ η1 ≤ 1.
The efficiencies of the two detectors labelled in Fig. 1(a)
are listed in a column, where each column corresponds to a
spatial-temporal mode.
Mode 1 Mode 2
Detector ‘H/D’ η1 η2
Detector ‘V/A’ η2 η1
an incoming signal [5, 6] to influence the coupling of the
signal with the active detection area of a detector, while
for fiber-based signals simple time delays can be intro-
duced [3] to exploit uneven aligned detection time win-
dows. Therefore, in a setup with several detectors, the
efficiencies of these detectors can not only differ from each
other but also depend on the spatial-temporal modes cou-
pled to the detectors, giving rise to the so-called spatial-
temporal-mode-dependent mismatch. In this work we
analyze the security in both above scenarios.
Bob’s detectors may respond to a large number of
spatial-temporal modes. If the detection efficiencies re-
lated to these modes differ strongly from each other, it
might become possible for Eve to control Bob’s detection
events thoroughly by sending the signals to the modes
that couple particularly well only to a specific detector of
Bob for which Eve desired to cause a detection event. For
this attack to be possible in its extreme form, the number
of modes must be equal to, or larger than, the number
of detectors in the setup. For this reason, we choose the
number of controllable modes to be equal to the number
of detectors. In order to obtain visually simple illustra-
tions of the secret-key rates, we choose mismatch models
parametrized by two values for the efficiencies: a high
value η1 for one detector, and a lower value η2 for the
other detectors, as shown in Tables I and II. We empha-
size that these mismatch models are considered just for
ease of visual presentation, as the approach developed
here can be exploited with an arbitrary mismatch model.
To analyze the security of QKD systems, for example in
a certification process, the choice of the mismatch model
and its parameters will need to be justified in practice.
III. KEY-RATE CALCULATION METHOD
A. Formulation of key-rate calculation as a
convex-optimization problem
The asymptotic key rate certifiable against all collec-
tive attacks [13] is given by the difference between two
terms, which are associated with privacy amplification
(PA) and error correction (EC) respectively. The EC
term depends only the the measurement statistics and
can be calculated without any further information on the
TABLE II. Spatial-temporal-mode-dependent mismatch
model in the passive-detection scheme, where 0 ≤ η2 ≤ η1 ≤
1. The efficiencies of the four detectors labelled in Fig. 1(b)
are listed in a column, where each column corresponds to a
spatial-temporal mode.
Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 3 Mode 4
Detector ‘H’ η1 η2 η2 η2
Detector ‘V ’ η2 η1 η2 η2
Detector ‘D’ η2 η2 η1 η2
Detector ‘A’ η2 η2 η2 η1
implementation of the QKD protocol. The main diffi-
culty of the security proof relies on how to obtain a lower
bound on the PA term. As shown in Refs. [14, 15], a
reliable numerical lower bound on the PA term can be
provided by solving a convex-optimization problem. In
the following, we will give a brief review of the theory
behind that reformulation.
In a generic QKD protocol, the measurement statis-
tics in an experiment are summarized as a probability
distribution pAB(x, y), where x and y are random vari-
ables corresponding to the events detected by Alice and
Bob respectively. The corresponding measurement oper-
ators are MAx and M
B
y . In addition, for the techniques
shown in this paper, we will be able to provide from ex-
perimental observations lower bounds on the probability
of at most k photons arriving at Bob. These bounds
will be brought in as additional explicit constraints in
the convex-optimization problem. To formulate the cor-
responding constraints, we introduce the projectors Πk
onto the photon-number subspace of Bob containing at
most k photons, and the corresponding lower bound on
its expectation value as bk. Then, the calculation of the
PA term, denoted by α, can be written as the convex-
optimization problem [14, 15]
α := minρAB D(G(ρAB)||Z(G(ρAB)))
subject to ρAB ≥ 0,Tr (ρAB) = 1
Tr(MAx ⊗MBy ρAB) = pAB(x, y)
Tr(ΠkρAB) ≥ bk .
(2)
Here, D(σ||τ) := Tr(σ log2 σ)−Tr(σ log2 τ) is the relative
entropy, G is the post-selection map, and Z is the quan-
tum channel describing the key map of the QKD protocol
(see below for the details). In our applications we will
later choose for the photon-number cut-off k ∈ {1, 2}, or
use even the constraints for both values of k. We remark
that both the objective function and constraints are con-
vex in the optimization variable ρAB.
Once we obtain a reliable lower bound β on the PA
term α of Eq. (2) as β ≤ α according to the numerical
method developed in Ref. [15], the asymptotic key rate
4K per round is bounded by
K ≥ β − leakECobs, (3)
where leakECobs denotes the amount of information leaked
to the adversary per round of the protocol during error
correction. This takes automatically into account any
post-selection mechanism of the protocol, as any jointly
discarded signals do not cause an error-correction cost.
Likewise, the PA cost β automatically takes care of the
same post-selection process, so that the total key rate
K is counted as per round of the protocol. As we are
discussing key rates in the asymptotic limit of a large
number of exchanged signals, the reduction by any frac-
tion of signals that is utilized to estimate the observed
probability distribution pAB(x, y) of measurement results
and other finite size effects are negligible. Furthermore,
the security proofs under collective and coherent attacks
are equivalent in this limit [16], and hence our approach
holds for coherent attacks.
The map G in the objective function of Eq. (2) de-
scribes the post-selection after Alice’s and Bob’s public
announcements for sifting. For simplicity, we concen-
trate here on the case where to distill secret keys Alice
and Bob keep only those signals where both measured in
the H/V basis. Note that for optical implementations,
the announcements usually used for sifting are slightly
more involved than the simple basis-dependent sifting
of the BB84 protocol. The reason is that the poten-
tial presence of multiple photons in the incoming signals
can cause several detectors to show detection events si-
multaneously. If Bob uses the active-detection scheme,
the sifting announcement by Bob consists of the declara-
tion whether he used the H/V basis measurement, and
whether at least one detector fired. However, if Bob uses
the passive-detection scheme, we have to decide what to
do with events where we have multiple detections across
the groups associated with different polarization bases
(cross clicks), for example both the H and the D detec-
tor firings. Here we make the choice to keep only those
events where either the H, the V , or both the H and
V (denoted as HV event) detectors fire, while all other
events (no clicks, clicks only in any of the D and the A
detectors, or cross clicks) are being discarded. In order
to achieve this goal, Alice publicly announces the basis
choice where one of two bases is chosen uniformly ran-
domly at each round, and Bob announces whether the
desired events are observed. This corresponds to apply-
ing the post-selection map
G(ρAB) = GρABG†, (4)
where G = 1√
2
1lA ⊗
√
MBH +M
B
V +M
B
HV is a Kraus op-
erator. Here, 1lA is the identity operator in the state
space of Alice, and the positive-operator valued measure
(POVM) elements MBH , M
B
V , and M
B
HV for Bob have
been derived in Appendix A and B of Ref. [17], with the
remark that for the active-detection scheme we need to
put the coefficient 1/2 before each POVM element shown
in Ref. [17] to account for Bob’s probability of selecting
each measurement basis.
After the public announcements and the corresponding
post-selection step, Alice chooses a key map, which is
represented by a quantum channel Z. The key map is
a function whose input is Alice’s measurement outcome
in the key-generation basis and whose output is a key
value, 0 or 1. Suppose that we make a particular choice
of key map here, namely that Alice’s outcomes H and
V are mapped to key values 0 and 1, respectively, and
that the corresponding POVM elements MAH and M
A
V
are projective (see Appendix A). The application of the
key map corresponds to the application of the quantum
channel
Z(G(ρAB)) = MAH ⊗ 1lBG(ρAB)MAH ⊗ 1lB
+MAV ⊗ 1lBG(ρAB)MAV ⊗ 1lB. (5)
Given the measurement statistics pAB(x, y), the lower
bounds bk on the photon-number distribution, the post-
selection map G, and the key-map-realizing quantum
channel Z, in principle we can run numerical optimiza-
tion to obtain a reliable lower bound of the minimization
problem in Eq. (2). However, for the situation studied,
the number of photons arriving at Bob is unbounded and
so the dimension of the quantum state ρAB is infinite. For
this reason we need to develop techniques that allow us
to simplify the optimization problem such that a reliable
key-rate lower bound can be numerically obtained using
finite-dimensional quantum states. These techniques are
described in the next two subsections.
B. Simplification of the convex-optimization
problem: Flag-state squasher
Since Bob’s measurement POVMs are block-diagonal
with respect to the subspaces associated with total pho-
ton numbers across all modes [17], we can assume with-
out loss of generality that Eve performs a quantum non-
demolition (QND) measurement of the total photon num-
ber after her interaction with the signals, and before their
arrivals at Bob’s side. As a consequence, the state ρAB
can be assumed, without loss of generality, to be block-
diagonal in the same subspace structure, meaning that
the state takes the form
ρAB =
∞⊕
n=0
pnρ
(n)
AB. (6)
The weight of each subspace carrying a total number of
n photons is given by the corresponding probability pn,
and the corresponding normalized conditional state is de-
noted by ρ
(n)
AB.
Considering the block-diagonal structure of the state
5and Bob’s measurement POVMs, we can write
ρAB = pn≤kρ
(n≤k)
AB
⊕
(1− pn≤k)ρ(n>k)AB ,
MBy = M
B
y,n≤k
⊕
MBy,n>k, (7)
where k is a free parameter chosen in the security proof
and pn≤k is the probability that no more than k photons
arrive at Bob. The (n ≤ k)-photon subspace is of finite
dimension, which is compatible with the numerical key-
rate optimization framework. On the other hand, the
(n > k)-photon subspace is infinite dimensional, which
is not directly suitable to be handled by our numerical
methods. To resolve this problem, we introduce the flag-
state squasher. The general framework of squashing mod-
els that map large-dimensional measurement descriptions
without loss of generality to lower-dimensional systems
has been described in Refs. [18–20].
Theorem 1. Flag-State Squasher Suppose that we
have a POVM with elements My, where y ∈ {1, . . . , J},
such that each element can be written in a block-diagonal
form My,n≤k ⊕My,n>k, with an associated Hilbert space
structure given by Hn≤k ⊕ Hn>k. Then there exists a
completely positive trace preserving (CPTP) map Λ (re-
ferred to as a squashing map) from Hn≤k ⊕ Hn>k to
Hn≤k ⊕ HJ , where the dimension dim(HJ) = J , such
that Tr {ρMy} = Tr[Λ(ρ)M˜y] ∀ρ ∈ Hn≤k ⊕Hn>k with
M˜y = My,n≤k ⊕ |y〉〈y| , (8)
where the states |y〉 form an orthonormal basis of HJ .
Proof. We need to show that the CPTP map Λ exists
with the desired properties. This can be done by explicit
construction as indicated in Fig. 2. For this purpose, we
consider a general input state given in block form ρin =(
ρbb ρbB
ρBb ρBB
)
, where index ‘b’ refers to the subspace
n ≤ k and index ’B’ to subspace n > k. We can then
describe the action of the squashing map Λ by its action
onto an arbitrary input state of the above form as
Λ(ρin) =
(
ρbb 0
0
∑J
y=1 (Tr [My,n>kρBB ] |y〉〈y|)
)
. (9)
The second subspace, which in the case of our mea-
surement will be infinite dimensional, is simply reduced
to a smaller subspace by performing the measurement
on that subspace and flagging the result of that partial
measurement into an orthogonal register which replaces
the original second subspace. This approach of creat-
ing squashing models to smaller total Hilbert spaces re-
lies only on the block-diagonal structure of the original
POVM elements. As soon that assumption is met, a flag-
state squasher can be constructed.
squashing map
FIG. 2. Constructive description of the squashing map for
the flag-state squasher. Each line corresponds to a subspace
of the input Hilbert space associated with the block-diagonal
decomposition of the POVM elements, as indicated on the
left side.
As in any case where a squashing map exists mapping
the original measurement to an alternative measurement
in a smaller dimension, we can assume that the squashing
map is part of Eve’s action. As a result, we overestimate
Eve’s power (see below for a detailed explanation), but as
a trade-off we can now assume without further loss of gen-
erality that Bob receives signals in the reduced Hilbert
space. So the key-rate optimization problem in Eq. (2)
formulated with the squashed states of the form in Eq. (9)
and POVM elements of the form in Eq. (8), which is a
finite-dimensional convex-optimization problem, will pro-
vide a lower bound on the secret-key rate in the actual
implementation. Note, however, that the virtual POVM
element components M˜By,n>k = |y〉〈y| are projective and
orthogonal. Therefore, Eve could perform a strong at-
tack by measuring the incoming signals from Alice with
Bob’s actual measurement {MBy : y = 1, . . . , J} and then
preparing/sending to Bob the flag state |y′〉 conditional
on her measurement result y′. This attack would deter-
ministically trigger the same result y′ when Bob performs
the virtual measurement {M˜By : y = 1, . . . , J} according
to the squashing map. Hence, by attributing the squash-
ing map to Eve’s action, Eve could completely learn every
result of Bob, and so we overestimate the power of Eve
as compared with in the actual implementation. For this
reason, the flag-state squasher must be accompanied by
a constraint that limits the resulting state mostly to the
(n ≤ k)-photon subspace, which is given by the bound
bk in our optimization problem of Eq. (2).
Finally, we remark that without loss of generality the
states ρAB and ρ
(n)
AB can be assumed to be real-valued.
This is because all measurement POVM elements MAx
and MBy of Alice and Bob can be represented by real-
valued matrices and because the objective function to be
minimized for bounding the key rate in Eq. (2) is a con-
vex function of the state ρAB. For detailed proofs see for
example Sec. V C in Ref. [21]. We also emphasize that
the block-diagonal structure and the real-matrix repre-
sentation of the state ρAB apply to both the active- and
6passive-detection schemes. By using a real-matrix repre-
sentation of ρAB, the number of free parameters in the
key-rate optimization problem of Eq. (2) is reduced.
C. Constraints on photon-number distribution
To solve the convex-optimization problem in Eq. (2),
we need make use of a flag-state squasher as introduced in
Theorem 1 where the small-dimensional subspace will be
chosen to be the incoming subspace containing at most
n = 1 photon, or at most n = 2 photons. In order to ob-
tain positive key rates, it will be necessary to show that
the overlap of the incoming states with this subspace can
be lower-bounded by some number bk, k = 1 or 2. Fol-
lowing the numerical method developed in our previous
study of entanglement verification with efficiency mis-
match [17], we obtain such bounds directly from the ex-
perimentally observed measurement statistics pAB(x, y).
The intuition behind this approach is that higher pho-
ton numbers will necessarily lead to double clicks, cross
clicks, and/or errors.
This way of using experimental observations to bound
the photon-number distribution was first established in
Ref. [2] and further refined in Ref. [22], and then extended
to the case of inefficient detectors in Ref. [17]. Note that
the theoretical approach is independent of the number
of spatial-temporal modes that we use (in addition to
the polarization degree of freedom). We demonstrate the
results of our method here for the two-mode case (with
the active-detection scheme) and for the four-mode case
(with the passive-detection scheme).
Before explaining the method, we would like to point
out that the two properties of the state ρAB discussed in
the above subsection, i.e., the block-diagonal structure
with respect to various photon-number subspaces and
the real-number representation of the density matrix, will
be used also in the optimization problems formulated in
this subsection. The second property helps to reduce the
number of free parameters in the optimization.
1. Active-detection case
As stated before, the intuition is that as an increasing
number of photons are received by Bob, the probability of
double clicks (clicks at both detectors) will increase and
finally surpass the double-click probability observed in
an experiment. Similar arguments hold for an effective
error, which we define below. Thus we will show that
the experimental observations allow us to put an upper
bound on the probability that the signals received by Bob
contain more than any given number of photons.
In order to make this intuition precise, we start by
defining the double-click operator
FDC =
1
2
1lA ⊗MBHV +
1
2
1lA ⊗MBDA, (10)
and the effective-error operator
FEE =
1
2
MAH ⊗ (MBV +
1
2
MBHV ) +
1
2
MAV ⊗ (MBH +
1
2
MBHV )
+
1
2
MAD ⊗ (MBA +
1
2
MBDA) +
1
2
MAA ⊗ (MBD +
1
2
MBDA),
(11)
where the pre-factor 1/2 at each term describes the prob-
ability to choose the corresponding measurement basis.
The form of the effective-error operator is chosen ac-
cording to the squashing model [18, 19] for the active-
detection scheme: there double-click events are mapped
uniformly randomly in a post-processing step to either
of the two single-click events associated with the chosen
basis. In Eqs. (10) and (11), Alice’s measurement opera-
tors are ideal measurement operators in the one-photon
space (see Appendix A), while Bob’s measurement oper-
ators are described in Appendix A and B of Ref. [17].
We formalize the above intuition by studying the fol-
lowing optimization problems
dn,min = minρ(n)AB
Tr
(
ρ
(n)
ABF
(n)
DC
)
subject to ρ
(n)
AB ≥ 0
Tr
(
ρ
(n)
AB
)
= 1
(12)
and
en,min = minρ(n)AB
Tr
(
ρ
(n)
ABF
(n)
EE
)
subject to ρ
(n)
AB ≥ 0
Tr
(
ρ
(n)
AB
)
= 1 .
(13)
The operators F
(n)
DC and F
(n)
EE are projections of the oper-
ators FDC and FEE onto the n-photon subspace of Bob.
We remark that the above optimizations are over all pos-
sible n-photon states ρ
(n)
AB, while the optimization prob-
lems formulated in our previous study of entanglement
verification with efficiency mismatch [17] run over only
the states ρ
(n)
AB satisfying the positive-partial-transpose
criterion [23, 24].
The optimization problems described by Eqs. (12)
and (13) have the form of semi-definite programs (SDPs).
In order to solve them, we utilize the YALMIP [25] tool-
box in MATLAB. From our calculations we make the
observation that the minimum double-click probability
dn,min monotonically increases as the the photon num-
ber n goes up. We therefore obtain the inequality
dn,min ≥ d3,min,∀n ≥ 3. (14)
Moreover, we observed the inequality relations
en,min ≥ e3,min,∀n ≥ 3, (15)
7and
en,min ≥ emin := min{e2,min, e3,min},∀n ≥ 2. (16)
We would like to point out that we did not go through
the effort to prove the above inequalities with analytical
methods, though the numerical evidence strongly sup-
ports that these inequalities hold for an arbitrary active-
detection efficiency mismatch. In Figs. 3 and 4, we re-
port our numerical evidence for the specific mismatch
model of Table I. Especially, one can see from these fig-
ures that the curve becomes monotonous as the efficiency
mismatch increases.
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FIG. 3. The minimum double-click probability dn,min vs. the
photon number n received by Bob for the active-detection
mismatch model of Table I with η1 = 1 and η2 = η. Note the
monotonicity of each curve as a function of n and that d2,min,
as well as d1,min, is always equal to zero.
In view of Eqs. (14) and (15), we find that the double-
click probability dobs and the effective-error probability
eobs observed in practice satisfy
dobs =
∞∑
n=0
pn Tr
(
ρ
(n)
ABF
(n)
DC
)
≥ (1− p0 − p1 − p2)d3,min,
(17)
and
eobs =
∞∑
n=0
pn Tr
(
ρ
(n)
ABF
(n)
EE
)
≥ (1− p0 − p1 − p2)e3,min,
(18)
by using that
∑∞
n=0 pn = 1. Hence, we can set the bound
b2 ≤ p0 + p1 + p2 as
b2 = 1−min
( dobs
d3,min
,
eobs
e3,min
)
. (19)
Note that for the observations simulated in Sect. IV, we
found that dobsd3,min <
eobs
e3,min
and therefore the bound b2 =
1− dobsd3,min . Similarly, in view of Eq. (16) we have
eobs =
∞∑
n=0
pn Tr
(
ρ
(n)
ABF
(n)
EE
)
≥ (1− p0 − p1)emin. (20)
Thus we can obtain a bound b1 ≤ p0 + p1 as
b1 = 1− eobs
emin
. (21)
In this case, the double-click estimations do not lead to a
non-trivial bound on b1 as there exist two-photon states
that do not lead to double clicks (d2,min = 0), see Fig. 3.
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FIG. 4. The minimum effective-error probability en,min vs.
the photon number n received by Bob for the active-detection
mismatch model of Table I with η1 = 1 and η2 = η. Note that
e3,min is a lower bound for en,min when n ≥ 3 and that e1,min
is always equal to zero.
The above bounds b1 and b2 together with the flag-
state squasher approach for the corresponding subspaces
can be used in the key-rate optimization problem of
Eq. (2) when the active-detection scheme is used.
2. Passive-detection case
The passive-detection scheme utilizes a 50/50 beam
splitter to passively select a measurement basis, as shown
in Fig. 1(b). Clearly, the probability that each output
arm of the beam splitter contains at least one photon is
given by 1 − 2−(n−1). We therefore have the following
expectations: 1) The probability of simultaneous pho-
ton detections at both output arms (referred to as cross
clicks) would increase with the photon number n; 2) In
the limit of large n, the cross-click events would happen
with near certainty. These motivate us to consider the
associated cross-click operator
FCC = 1l
A ⊗MBCC , (22)
with MBCC being Bob’s cross-click POVM element (see
Appendix A and B of Ref. [17] for the derivation and
8expression of MBCC). To obtain bounds on the photon-
number distribution using experimental observations, we
thus consider the optimization problem
cn,min = minρ(n)AB
Tr
(
ρ
(n)
ABF
(n)
CC
)
subject to ρ
(n)
AB ≥ 0
Tr
(
ρ
(n)
AB
)
= 1 .
(23)
Here F
(n)
CC is the n-photon component of the cross-click
operator FCC .
Again, we solve this optimization problem using the
YALMIP toolbox [25] in MATLAB. The numerical so-
lutions of the optimization problem in Eq. (23) provide
strong evidence that the cross-click probability cn,min in-
creases monotonically with n and converges to the unit
value 1 for an arbitrary passive-detection efficiency mis-
match. We would like to point out that any evaluation
of secret-key rates using our approach requires solving
an SDP problem, such as those in Eqs. (12), (13) and 23,
thus allowing the validification of the working assumption
for a chosen mismatch model and parameters. Particu-
larly, the numerical evidence for our mismatch model and
parameters is shown in Fig. 5, which suggests the follow-
ing two inequalities
cn,min ≥ c3,min,∀n ≥ 3, (24)
and
cn,min ≥ c2,min,∀n ≥ 2. (25)
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FIG. 5. The minimum cross-click probability cn,min vs. the
photon number n received by Bob for the passive-detection
mismatch model of Table II with η1 = 1 and η2 = η. Note
the monotonicity of each curve as a function of n, supporting
the inequalities in Eqs. (24) and (25).
The inequality in Eq. (24) tells us that the cross-click
probability cobs observed in practice satisfies
cobs =
∞∑
n=0
pn Tr
(
ρ
(n)
ABF
(n)
CC
)
≥ (1− p0 − p1 − p2) c3,min.
(26)
Here we used the fact that
∑∞
n=0 pn = 1. Thus we obtain
a bound b2 ≤ (p0 + p1 + p2) as
b2 = 1− cobs
c3,min
. (27)
Similarly, from Eq. (25) we can obtain a bound b1 ≤
(p0 + p1) as
b1 = 1− cobs
c2,min
. (28)
The above bounds b1 and b2 together with the flag-
state squasher approach for the corresponding subspaces
can be used in the key-rate optimization problem of
Eq. (2) when the passive-detection scheme is used.
IV. SECRET-KEY RATES WITH SIMULATED
OBSERVATIONS
As pointed out before, the method developed in
Sect. III allows a security analysis of a QKD setup with
an arbitrary detection-efficiency mismatch. Any such se-
curity analysis requires the determination of constraints
on the probability of the state in a subspace containing
at most a given number of photons, and then a key-rate
lower bound can be obtained using those constraints to-
gether with a flag-state squasher. We now illustrate our
approach for the specific mismatch models of Tables I and
II. As the security analysis usually requires as input some
data observed in experiments, we replace here the exper-
iments by simulations according to a simple quantum-
optical model. We specify this toy model below, but it
is important to point out that this toy model is not part
of the security analysis, or in anyway an assumption on
which our security proof itself is based.
A. Data simulation
We study a BB84 protocol with an ideal single-photon
source using polarization encoding. As described in
Sect. II, at each round of the protocol Alice prepares
one of four possible single-photon polarization states se-
lected uniformly randomly. Bob can use either the active-
or passive-detection scheme. In the active-detection
scheme, we assume that at each round Bob can ran-
domly select the key-generation basis with probability
p = 1/2. The single photon prepared by Alice is trans-
mitted through the adversary’s domain to Bob. We
model the corresponding quantum channel as a depolar-
izing channel Λ(ρ) = (1 − ω)ρ + ω 121 with depolarizing
9probability ω; additionally, the single-photon transmis-
sion efficiency over the channel is t. In order to introduce
multiple detector clicks, Eve intercepts in our channel
model with probability r the single photon and resends
multiple photons to Bob. Specifically, Eve resends ran-
domly polarized m photons in the state
ρm =
1
2mpi
∫ 2pi
0
dθ
(
aˆ†θ
)m
|0〉 〈0| (aˆθ)m . (29)
Here, the photon-creation operator aˆ†θ is given in terms
of the operators aˆ†H and aˆ
†
V of the respective linear polar-
izations as aˆ†θ = cos(θ)aˆ
†
H +sin(θ)aˆ
†
V . In our simulations,
we will choose the photon number m = 2.
When applying the flag-state squasher approach, we
choose to separate either the (n ≤ 1)-photon or the
(n ≤ 2)-photon subspace from their respective comple-
ments. In our efficiency-mismatch models we consider
several spatio-temporal modes, in addition to the po-
larization mode. In our toy quantum channel, we ad-
ditionally assume that the optical signals are uniformly
randomly distributed over all considered spatio-temporal
modes.
B. Key rates in the absence of mismatch:
Trade-offs between transmission efficiency and
detection efficiency
As mentioned in the introduction, when there is no ef-
ficiency mismatch between the detectors used in the mea-
surement device, one can pull the detection inefficiency
out of the detectors and into the channel action, creating
an effective transmission loss. Consequently, the mea-
surement device now is described by an ideal-detector
setup for which a squashing model [18–20] exists, and
so one can execute a full security proof. However, the
resulting key rate might be conservatively low, because
the existing security proof assumes that the photon loss
during the actual transmission, as well as that due to the
detection inefficiency, can be manipulated by Eve while
under the original description of Bob’s measurement de-
vice the photon loss inside of the device cannot be ac-
cessed by Eve. Such fact has been explicitly pointed out
in literature such as in Ref. [26]. So while it is known
that this is an overly pessimistic assumption, the issue is
that proof techniques were missing to treat the security
assuming the detection efficiency to be not accessible by
Eve. We can tackle this question now with the techniques
developed in this work.
With our numerical method, we can prove the security
of a QKD protocol with arbitrary measurement operators
as long as they are well characterized. In particular, we
can characterize the detection efficiency of each detector
in a measurement device, and so we can determine the
corresponding measurement operators (see Appendix A
and B of Ref. [17]). In this way, we can study the in-
dividual effects of transmission efficiency and detection
efficiency on the secret-key rate. To demonstrate these
effects, for this particular result we assume for simplic-
ity that each optical signal arriving at Bob contains no
more than two photons, rather than using our flag-state
squasher approach.
The results are shown in Fig. 6. From this figure, one
can see that given the fixed total photon loss over both
transmission and detection, Alice and Bob can distill
more secret keys if they consider detection inefficiency
and transmission loss separately rather than lumping
these two kinds of losses together in the security proof.
In particular, when the product tη is fixed, the higher the
value of t, the higher the secret-key rate is. On the other
hand, when t and η are lumped together as an effective
transmission efficiency tη, our numerical method provides
the same key-rate lower bound 14pdet (1− 2h(e)) (see the
results plotted in Fig. 6 when η = 1), with the detection
probability pdet at the key-generation basis, the qubit er-
ror rate e and the binary entropy function h(e), as the
standard security proofs with the help of the squashing
model [18–20] for treating multiple-detection events.
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FIG. 6. Key rate per round in bits vs. the detection efficiency
η of all detectors used in Bob’s measurement device as shown
in Fig. 1. We consider both the active- and passive-detection
schemes. For data simulation, we fix the depolarizing prob-
ability ω = 0.05, the multi-photon probability r = 0.05, and
the product of transmission efficiency t and detection effi-
ciency η to be tη = 0.1. We choose these values just for ease
of graphical illustrations. We remark that under each detec-
tion scheme, the probability distribution observed by Alice
and Bob does not change with η as long as the simulation
parameters ω, r and tη are fixed.
We also performed numerical calculations, not pre-
sented here, which show that the higher the multi-photon
probability r, the more significant improvement in the
secret-key rate is achieved when separating t and η in
the security proof. Particularly, we observed that when
the optical signal has no multi-photon component (i.e.,
r = 0), the secret-key rate is independent of η as long as ω
and tη are fixed. However, in practice multiple-detection
events occur due to the use of sources containing multi-
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photon states, cross talks in fibers, or dark counts in
detectors.
C. Key rates with active-detection efficiency
mismatch
Let us study the dependence of the secret-key rate
on the detection-efficiency mismatch with the active-
detection scheme. We consider two scenarios: In the
one-mode scenario all photons received by Bob are in
the same spatial-temporal mode, and the two detec-
tors labelled by ‘H/D’ and ‘V/A’ in Fig. 1(a) have ef-
ficiencies η1 and η2 respectively; in the two-mode sce-
nario the photons received by Bob can stay in one of
two possible spatial-temporal modes. The efficiency mis-
match for the combinations of spatial-temporal modes
and polarization detectors is shown as in Table I. For
security proofs, we make use of and compare two differ-
ent assumptions/techniques to deal with potential multi-
photon signals arriving at Bob’s detectors: we either
assume that each signal received by Bob contains no
more than two photons, or we prove security without
such assumption. In the latter case we apply a flag-state
squasher using the (≤ 2)-photon subspace and its com-
plementary subspace, and in the key-rate optimization
problem of Eq. (2) we incorporate the lower bounds b1
and b2 on the photon-number probabilities (p0 + p1) and
(p0 + p1 + p2). These bounds are based on observations
and are discussed in Sect. III C (see Eqs. (19) and (21)).
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FIG. 7. Key rate per round in bits vs. the detection efficiency
η2 of the detector labelled by ‘V/A’ (for the signals stayed
in the first spatial-temporal mode) in the active-detection
scheme of Fig. 1(a). For data simulation, we fix the detec-
tion efficiency of the detector labelled by ‘H/D’ (for the sig-
nals stayed in the first spatial-temporal mode) to η1 = 0.2.
We also fix the depolarizing probability ω = 0.05, the multi-
photon probability r = 0.05, and the transmission efficiency
t = 0.5 (corresponding to 3dB loss). We remark that for the
active-detection scheme the key rate scales linearly with the
probability p for Bob to select the key-generation basis when
other simulation parameters are fixed.
The typical results are shown in Fig. 7. We can make
directly several observations from Fig. 7:
1. The larger the efficiency mismatch, the lower the
secret-key rate is. There exists a threshold for the
efficiency mismatch beyond which it is not possible
for Alice and Bob to distill secret keys.
2. Making assumptions on Eve’s attack strategy, such
as assuming that no more than two photons are
being resent from Eve to Bob, can overestimate
the true secret-key rate computed according to the
analysis without making that assumption.
3. The spatial-temporal-mode-dependent mismatch
helps Eve to attack the QKD system. Our results
show that Eve’s corresponding freedom to manipu-
late the detection efficiencies decreases the secret-
key rate.
4. If there is no efficiency mismatch, then the secret-
key rate does not differ whether we consider one or
two spatial-temporal modes. Note that in this case
the lower bounds b1 and b2 in Eqs. (21) and (19)
are independent of the number of spatial-temporal
modes, and so is the key-rate optimization problem
in Eq. (2).
D. Key rates with passive-detection efficiency
mismatch
As in the active-detection scheme, we consider two
scenarios: In the single-mode scenario all photons re-
ceived by Bob are in the same spatial-temporal mode,
and the four detectors labelled by ‘H’, ‘V ’, ‘D’ and ‘A’
in Fig. 1(b) have efficiencies η1, η2, η2, η2 respectively; in
the four-mode scenario the photons received by Bob can
stay in one of four possible spatial-temporal modes. The
efficiency mismatch in the four spatial-temporal modes
are shown as in Table II. In the security proofs, we
again compare the flag-state squasher approach with the
photon-number cut-off assumption. Note that for the
case with one spatial-temporal mode, we apply a flag-
state squasher that uses the photon-number subspace
containing at most two photons and its complementary
subspace, and at the same time we incorporate the lower
bounds b1 and b2 in Eqs. (28) and (27). For the case with
four spatial-temporal modes, instead we apply a flag-
state squasher using the subspace of at most one photon,
and exploit the corresponding bound on the probability
in that subspace given by the bound b1. We do not use
the tighter approach using the subspace containing at
most two photons, due to the complexity of the corre-
sponding key-rate optimization problem in the presence
of four spatial-temporal modes. The typical results are
shown in Fig. 8. Similar to the active-detection case, the
results suggest that the larger the efficiency mismatch,
the lower the secret-key rate is. When the efficiency mis-
match is large enough, it is not possible for Alice and
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Bob to distill secret keys. The results also suggest that
spatial-temporal-mode-dependent mismatch helps Eve to
attack the QKD system.
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FIG. 8. Key rate per round in bits vs. the detection ef-
ficiency η2 of the detectors labelled by ‘V ’, ‘D’ or ‘A’ (for
the signals stayed in the first spatial-temporal mode) in the
passive-detection scheme of Fig. 1(b). For data simulation,
we fix the detection efficiency of the detector labelled by ‘H’
(for the signals stayed in the first spatial-temporal mode) to
η1 = 0.2. We also fix the depolarizing probability ω = 0.05,
the multi-photon probability r = 0.05, and the transmission
efficiency t = 0.5 (corresponding to 3dB loss).
We remark that one cannot straightforwardly com-
pare the robustness of the active- and passive-detection
schemes against efficiency mismatch for distilling secret
keys via Figs. 7 and 8. The reasons are as follows:
First, there is no one-to-one correspondence between the
two mismatch models given in Tables I and II, for the
active- and passive-detection schemes respectively. Sec-
ond, for spatial-temporal-mode-dependent mismatch, in
the active-detection scheme we considered two spatial-
temporal modes and used both of the lower bounds on the
photon-number probabilities (p0 +p1) and (p0 +p1 +p2).
However, in the passive-detection scheme we considered
four spatial-temporal modes and used only the lower
bound on the photon-number probability (p0 + p1). The
more constraints on the photon-number distribution, the
higher the secret-key rate certified by our method is. We
emphasize that here we have developed a general method
for proving security of practical QKD protocols with ef-
ficiency mismatch. How to optimize our method and
improve the secret-key rates certified will require future
study.
V. CONCLUSION
The security proof of QKD usually assumes that the
threshold detectors used have the same detection effi-
ciency. However, in practice, their detection efficiencies
can show a mismatch, either due to the manufacturing
and setup, or the influence by an adversary (for example,
by controlling the spatio-temporal-mode-dependent cou-
pling of an optical signal with a detector). In this work
we present an approach that allows to lower-bound the
secret-key rate of a QKD setup with an arbitrary, but
specified detection-efficiency mismatch. We formulate
the key-rate calculation as a convex-optimization prob-
lem. In order to prove security without relying on a cut-
off of photon numbers in the optical signal, we exploit the
bounds on the photon-number distribution obtained from
semi-definite programs (SDPs), and simplify the key-rate
optimization problem by introducing a flag-state squash-
ing map. The SDP optimization problems are formulated
with the projections of measurement operators onto vari-
ous photon-number subspaces. These projections and so
the obtained key-rate lower bounds depend on the char-
acterized efficiency mismatch.
We illustrate the power of our method with numeri-
cal simulations, demonstrating that our method can be
numerically well handled even in the presence of spatial-
temporal-mode-dependent mismatch. Our method is
especially applicable to free-space QKD where spatial-
temporal-mode-dependent mismatch can be easily in-
duced by an adversary as demonstrated in Refs. [5, 6].
Moreover, with our method, one can clearly see the
individual effects of transmission loss and detection inef-
ficiency on the secret-key rate (see Fig. 6). In the par-
ticular case of no mismatch, the simulation results show
that our method provides a tighter lower bound on the
secret-key rate than the squashing model [18–20] when
we separate detection inefficiency (out of the domain of
Eve) from transmission loss (in the domain of Eve).
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Appendix A: Alice’s measurement operators
We assume that the quantum system A held by Alice is
two-dimensional and that Alice performs ideal one-qubit
measurements with perfect detection efficiency. In partic-
ular, Alice’s measurement operators MAH , M
A
V , M
A
D , and
MAA are ideal polarization-measurement operators in the
one-photon space. In the basis {|1H , 0V 〉A , |0H , 1V 〉A}
of Alice’s one-photon space over two polarization modes,
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these operators are represented as
MAH =
(
1 0
0 0
)
, MAV =
(
0 0
0 1
)
,
MAD = 1/2
(
1 1
1 1
)
, MAA = 1/2
(
1 −1
−1 1
)
. (A1)
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